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THE SCOPE OF PUBLIC POLICY UNDER THE
ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION

AcT, 1996
O.P. Malhotra*

In this paper, the author examines the true meaning of the term
"publicpolicy" under the Arbitrationand ConciliationAct, 1996,
for the purpose of setting aside arbitralawards. The author surveys
contrastingjudicial decisions and defends the much-maligned
decision of the Supreme Court of India in ONGC v. Saw Pipes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Public policy is a ground for setting aside an arbitral award under section
34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.' The provision mirrors the
Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, London; Senior Advocate, Supreme
Court of India and author of
1

o.

P. MAIUjnA, THE LAw AND PRAciCE OF ARBrrATnON (2006).

Hereinafter "the Act." § 34 further explains that without prejudice to the generality
of the public policy of India "an award is in conflict with the public policy of India if
the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was in
violation of Section 75 or Section 81."
23
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UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. Section 48 of
the Act also states that a foreign arbitral award may be set aside if it is in opposition
to the public policy of India.
The term "public policy", is of course, a nebulous one and incapable of any
precise definition. Public policy has been described as 'a principle of judicial
legislation or interpretation founded on the current needs of the community'
When courts perform this function undoubtedly they legislate judicially. That is
however, a kind of legislation implicitly delegated to them to further the object of
the legislation and to promote the goals of society. A prioriit is variable in nature.
However, the rationale for the doctrine of public policy remains that while it is in
general desirable that parties have autonomy to enter into contracts, when that
autonomy is outweighed by public interest, a court will refuse to enforce the
contract. The reasoning that applies for having public policy as a ground to set
aside an arbitral award is the same.
The rationale behind this paper is to examine what the meaning of the term
"public policy" should be, in the context of setting aside arbitral awards. Two
landmark and contrasting decisions of the Supreme Court, in this regard, are
analysed.

IL

THE RENUSAGAR CASE
THE NARRow VIEW OF PUBLIC POLICY
In the landmark decision in Renusagar Power Co Ltd v. General Electric
dealing with the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act 1961
section 7(1)(b)(ii), the Supreme Court stated the law:
Co,2

"Since the Foreign Awards Act is concerned with recognition and
enforcement of foreign awards which are governed by the principles
of private international law, the expression "public policy" in section
7(l)(b)(ii) of the Foreign Awards Act must necessarily be construed
in the sense the doctrine of public policy is applied in the field of
private international law, Applying these criteria it must be held that
the enforcement of a foreign award would be refused on the ground
that it is contrary to public policy if such enforcement would be
contrary to (i) fundamental policy of Indian law; or (ii) the interests
of India; or (iii) justice or morality."3
1994 Supp (1) S.C.C. 644.

These points were based on CHESHIRE & NORTH, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 131 (1992)
which classified four grounds on which English courts would refuse to enforce a
24
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Though this statement of law was made in the context of enforcement of a
foreign (New York Convention) award, it has been held to be relevant for setting
aside arbitral awards under section 34(2)(b)(ii) on the ground that the award is in

conflict with the public policy of India as well.4 The implication of this decision is
that an award with a patent illegality can be enforced, as long as that illegality
itself is not contrary to the public policy of India.

111.

THE ONGC CASE: A BROADER VIEW OF PUBUC POLICY

The decision of the Supreme Court in ONGCv. SAWPipes Ltd5 has provoked
considerable adverse comment. 6 Particularly the comments of the Law
Commission of India in its 176th Report and the comments of Arden LJ in an
illuminating lecture7 are noteworthy. The crux of all the comments is that the
ONGC case sets the clock back to the pre-1996 era when parties could challenge
arbitral awards on the ground of error of law apparent on the face of the award.
The purpose of the UNCITRAL Model Law and therefore, a priori,of the 1996 Act
was to leave that era behind. The decision of the Supreme Court in Renusagar
gives "public policy of India" a narrow meaning by confining judicial intervention
in an arbitral award only to the three grounds set forth in it, which are exhaustive
and incapable of expansion. My deference to the authors of those comments does
not prevent me offering a contrary view.
The facts of this case were as follows: the respondent company agreed to
supply casing pipes to the appellant and placed an order for steel plates, i.e. the
raw material required for their manufacture, with the appellant, an Italian supplier,
foreign acquired right on the ground that its enforcement would affront some moral

principle the maintenance of which admits of no possible compromise: (i) where the
fundamental conceptions of English justice are disregarded; (ii) where English
conceptions of morality are infringed; (iii) where a transaction prejudices the interests
of the United Kingdom or its good relations with foreign powers; (iv) where a foreign
law or statute offends English conceptions of human liberty and freedom of action.
See Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Jyoti Construction Co., 2003 (3)
Arb. L.R. 489.
- (2oo3) 5 S.C.C. 705, 709. See also Jagrnohan Singh Gujral v. Satish Ashok Sabnis,
2004 (1) Arb. L.R. 212.

See D.IR Dhanuka, A CriticalAnalysis of the Judgment ONGC v SAW Pipes Ltd., 2003
(2) Arb. L.R. 5 (SC) - Plea for Considerationby Larger Bench, 51(3) Arb. L.R. 1
(2003); S. Gupta, Challenge to ArbitralAwards on Public Policy: A Comment on ONGC
v. Saw Pipes Ltd., 52(3) Arb. L.R. 1 (2003).

7 Delivered at the 2nd Conference on Dispute Resolution 2003 on Arbitration and the
Courts, published in the journal of the International Centre for Alternative Dispute
Resolution (ICADR).
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within a certain time frame. As the flow of the supplies was impeded by a general
strike of steel mill workers all over Europe, the respondent requested the appellant
to extend the time limit for completion of the supplies. The appellant granted the
request, subject to the condition that the amount of liquidated damages stipulated
in the contract for delay in supply of pipes would be recovered from the
respondent. The appellant accordingly deducted amounts towards liquidated
damages as specified in the contract while making payment of the price.
In the arbitration proceedings that followed, the appellant did not prove
that it had suffered any loss or damage because of the delay. The tribunal decided
in favour of the respondent, holding that the amount of liquidated damages was
wrongfully deducted. The Bombay High Court dismissed the petition for setting
aside the award inter alia on the ground that the expression "in conflict with
public policy of India" used in section 34(2)(b)(ii) could not be interpreted to
mean that in case of violation of some provisions of law, without anything more,
the court could set aside the award.
On appeal, on a review of the earlier dicta, the Supreme Court held that the
phrase "public policy of India" used in the context of section 34, is required to be
given a wider meaning than in Renusagar, because the concept of public policy
connotes some matter which concerns public good and the public interest. What
is for the public good or in the public interest or what would be injurious or
harmful to the public good or public interest has varied from time to time. An
award which, primafacie violates statutory provisions cannot be said to be in the
public interest, because it is likely to adversely affect the administration of justice.
Accordingly, in addition to the three heads set forth in Renusagar, an award can
as well be annulled, being in conflict with public policy of India, if it is patently
illegal.8 The court however clarified that the illegality must go to the root of the
matter and, if the illegality is of a trivial nature, it cannot be held that the award is
against public policy. An award could also be set aside if it were so unfair and
unreasonable that it shocked the constience of the court. Such an award must be
adjudged void and opposed to the public policy of India.
On the facts, the Court held that the award on its face was erroneous and in
violation of the terms of the contract and a priori violative of the provisions of
section 28(3) of the Act. In other words, it was patently illegal and "a patently
illegal award is required to be set at naught, otherwise it would promote injustice".
Hence, if the award is erroneous on the basis of record with regard to the
proposition of law or its application, the court will have jurisdiction to interfere.
Therefore "giving limited jurisdiction to the court for having finality to the award
and resolving the dispute by speedier method would be much more frustrated by
* ONGC v. SAW Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 S.C.C. 705, 727.
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permitting a patently illegal award to operate". The question then is: What is an
error of law apparent on the face of record that justifies annulment of an award or
refusal to enforce a foreign award?

IV.

WHAT IS PATENT ILLEGALITY - ERROR OF LAW
APPARENT ON THE FACE OF THE AwAn?

In administrative law, 'error of law apparent on the face of the record' is
one of the established grounds for quashing judicial or quasi-judicial orders or
decisions on a writ of certiorari. In the United Kingdom a tribunal has now, in
effect, no scope to decide any question of law incorrectly: an error of law would
render its decision liable to be quashed as ultra vires. The court will, therefore,
quash any decisive error, because all errors of law are now jurisdictionaY In
India, however, an error of law apparent on the face of the record must be manifest
on the face of the proceedings or the decisions. In other words, it must be a
patently illegal error.o In all such cases, the impugned conclusion or decision
should be so plainly inconsistent with the relevant statutory provisions that no
difficulty is experienced by the reviewing court in holding that the error of law is
apparent on the face of the record.- An error apparent on the face of the record
must therefore be an obvious and patent mistake and not something which can be
established by a long-drawn-out process of reasoning on points on which there
may conceivably be two opinions. The error must be so blatant, so obvious, so
manifest or so palpable that when attention is invited to it, no elaborate argument
is needed to support the contention that the conclusion is erroneous.
Some instances of such blatant errors on face of the record or the decision
which would vitiate an arbitral award are: where the award is inconsistent with: a
constitutional provision; an Act of the Parliament or the State Legislature; the law
declared by the Supreme Court of India or the High Court having jurisdiction.
Such an award is vitiated by an error of law apparent on its face. In the context of
arbitration, an award inconsistent with any provision of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act 1996 suffers by a patent error of law apparent on its face. Any
decision or award suffering from such defects is a nullity without existence or
effect in law. It is a nullity as expressed by various epithets as 'void', 'void ab
initio', 'non est' and 'coram non judice'. It is an affront to the law and stands self9
1o

& CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH, ADMNISTRATVE LAw 286 (2000).
Prem Singh v. Deputy Custodian General, A.IR. 1957 S.C. 804 at 809, Parry & Co

WILLIAM WADE

Ltd v. P.C. Pal, (1970) 2 L.L.J. 429 (SC), Bijili Cotton Mills Pvt. Ltd. v. Industrial
Tribunal, 1972 Lab I.C. 1122 (SC); West Coast Motors v. District Magistrate, (1963)
1 L.L.J. 196.
" Syed Yakoob v. Radhakrishnan, A.IR. 1964 S.C. 477, 480.
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condemned. It bears a brand of invalidity on its forehead.2 It is incapable of being
enforced. Even though there is no ground in section 34(2) authorizing the court
to set aside such an award, its enforcement under section 36 may be resisted by
anyone against whom the award is made.
Section 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 provides 'a decree may be
executed ... by the court to which it is sent for execution'. Now, the law is well
settled that an executing court cannot go behind the decree. Nor can it question
its legality or correctness. It must take the decree as it stands.3 But there is one
exception to this general rule and that is that, where the decree sought to be
executed is a nullity for lack of inherent jurisdiction in the court passing it, its
invalidity can be set up in an execution proceeding. If the court which passed the
decree had no jurisdiction, the decree is a nullity incapable of execution and its
invalidity can be set up in the execution proceedings.4

V. CAN ONGC

BE FAULTED?

I am of the opinion that the ONGC case cannot be faulted by critics for the
following reasons:

A. Public Policy is not Inmutable
There is unanimity of English and Indian authorities that the concept of
public policy is not immutable. The rules on which the public policies of a nation
are founded at a particular time, on proper occasion, are capable of expansion
and modification. In modern progressive society with fast-changing social norms
and concepts, it is more and more imperative to evolve new heads of public policy.
The courts have responded to this challenge in the past by minting new heads and
when the exigencies of justice require they will do so again.
In light of this position of law, ONGC was justified in adding a fourth
imperative head to the three set forth in Renusagar. It is relevant to note here
that the three heads set out in Renusagar were stated by the court for the first
time. Before that, the parameters of the scope of public policy of India had not
been defined. Therefore, if one bench of the Supreme Court could list the three
heads of the public policy of India in Renusagar, there is no justifiable reason to
fault ONGC merely because another bench has added one more head to the three
already existing. It is rather surprising, however, that in this of all areas the courts
should be expected to surrender their function of developing the law.
coined by Lord Radcliffe in Smith v. East Elloe, [1956] 1 All E.R. 855 (HL).
Bank of Behar v. Saranghaidhai Singh, A.I.R. 1949 P.C. 8.

13 Phrase
'3

'4

Jnanendra Mohan v. Rabindra Nath, A.IR. 1933 P.C. 61.
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B. FundamentalPolicy of Indian Law
Even assuming that the head, 'patent illegality' of the award which goes to
the root of the matter or shocks the conscience of the court, could not be added to
the three heads already existing, such patent illegality is comprehended in the
very first head set out in Renusagar,"fundamental policy of Indian law" itself.
For instance, an award inconsistent with a constitutional provision; or an Act of
Parliament, particularly the Arbitration Act; a judgment of the Supreme Court or
a High Court having jurisdiction over the arbitration, will evidently be patently
illegal and contrary to the "fundamental policy of Indian law". And an award
which does not state "the reasons upon which it is based" will be patently illegal,
being inconsistent with section 31(3) of the Act. All such awards will be patently
illegal and inconsistent with the "fundamental policy of Indian law".
C. Unenforceability of the Award
A patently illegal award, where its illegality goes to the root of the matter or
is so unfair and unreasonable that it shocks the conscience of the court, will be
void ab initio and a nullity. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in
Sunder Dass, it will be incapable of enforcement under section 36. Its enforcement,
therefore, under section 38 and Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908
may be successfully resisted, because it will cause substantial injustice to the
applicant.
D. Recommendations of the Law Commission of India
It is relevant to note here that in its 176th Report the Law Commission of
India itself has recommended insertion of a new section 34(A) proposing that two
more additional grounds of attack to be included in the application under section
34(1). These two additional grounds are (i) that there is an error which is apparent
on the face of the arbitral award giving rise to a substantial question of law, and (ii)
that the award has not given reasons though it was an award which was required
to contain reasons, not being one by way of settlement or one where the agreement
provided that reasons need nomiven.

VI. CONCLUSION
A survey of the contemporary English and Indian law, therefore, reveals
no justification to fault ONGC, which only modifies and expands the scope of
public policy of India as delimited in Renusagar. It adds one more head - patent
illegality of the award provided that the illegality goes to the root of the matter
or is so unfair and unreasonable that it shocks the conscience of the court.
Contrarily, if the court had not so modified the law it would have failed in its duty
to prevent subversion of societal goals and endangering the public good.
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